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"l. It shall be unlawful for any
person conducting, maintaining, or
operating a cabaret, bar and/or lounge,
dance hall, or discotheque, or any
(continued on page 2)
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a bar, lounge, or other public place to permit a waitress,

----

bar maid, or entertainer to appear with uncovered breasts,
and any person from appearing in any bar, lounge, or public
place with uncovered breasts.

The

usnc

(E.D. N.Y.) (Bartels),

concluding that a dismissal under the doctrine of Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and cases related to it was not
appropriate, found the ordinance unconstitutional in violation
of appellees' First Amendment rights and preliminarily enjoined

---.

appellants f rom prosecuting resps under the ordinance.
affirme d on both grounds.

.-CA

2

Appellants renew their contentions

here that the ordinance is not unconstitutional and that the

-

-

lower c our ts should have dismissed the action under Younger.

*I

-

c ont i n ue d from page 1/
other public place within the Town
of North Hempstead to suffer or
permit any waitress, barmaid,
entertainer, or other person who
comes in contact with, or ap 2 ears
b~
e, or is likely to come i n
contact with or appear before persons with breasts uncovered in such
a manner that the position of the
breast below the top of the areola
is not covered with a fully opaque
covering, or the lower part of the
torso uncovered or so thinly covered
or draped as to appear uncovered; or
to appear in any scene, sketch, act
or entertainment with breasts or the
lower part of the torso uncovered or
so thinly draped as to appear uncovered. References to breasts in
this section refers to females only.
Reference to the lower pa rt o f t h e
torso refers to both male and female.
(continued on page 3)

-

..

-

-

- 3 2.

FACTS:

Appellants are the police commissioner

-

of Nassau County, the town attorney of North Hempstead,
and the chief of police of Port Washington.

..

Appellees own

and operate bars in North Hempstead in which topless dancing
was provided as entertainment for their patrons.

On July 10,

1973, the Town of North Hempstead adopted the ordinance in
question.

After the adoption of the ordinance, appellees had

their entertainers wear bikini tops when performing.

On

August 9, 1973, appellees filed their federal lawsuit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 198'3.

A

temporary restraining order was denied by the DC (Dooling) on

-

August 10, 1973.

The return date for the motion for a pre-

liminary injunction was set for August 22.

After that denial,

appellee M & L Rest, Inc. resumed providing topless dancing as
entertainment, and on that day and the next three days it was
served with criminal summonses for violating the ordinance.
A hearing was set with respect to these charges in Nassau County

continued from page 2/

-

''2. It shall be unlawful for any
person to appear in any cabaret, bar
and/or lounge, dance hall, or discotheque
or any public place with breasts uncovered in such a manner that the portion of the
breasts below the top of the areola is not
covered with a fully opaque covering, or
the lower part of the torso uncovered or so
thinly covered or draped as to appear uncovered; or to appear in any scene, sketch,
act or entertainment with breasts or the
lower part of the torso uncovered or so
thinly draped as to appear uncovered.
Reference to breasts in this section refers
to females only. Reference to the lower
part of the torso refers to both male and
female."

-

-

-

- 4 -

Court for September 13, 1973.

The DC granted its pre-

liminary injunction to appellees on September 6, 1973.
The DC stressed the fact that at the time that the
federal action was filed there was no.pending state prosecution of any of the appellees and that subsequently such
a prosecution was initiated as to only one of the appellees .
There was no indication as to when the state courts would
make a final determination of the merits of appellees' claims.
Hence there was no basis for denying the other two appellees
a federal forum for the resolution of the constitutional
question raised.

-

If federal relief were granted _to two

appellees, it would be anomalous to deny relief to the third.
The DC found that an exercise of the police powe~ was not
,· permissible if it intruded upon First Amendment rights.
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), was irrelevant, since
the only justification given for the ordinance was the general
interests sought through the use of the police power.
question of obscenity was presented.

No

The DC concluded that the

ordinance had more than a chilling effect upon appellees'
exercise of their First Amendment right, since dancing is a form
of expression, and that the ordinance was overly broad.

.-

-

The

term "public place" had no limit as to possible interpretations;
it could include any indoor or outdoor assembly.

"Thus, this

ordinance would prohibit the performance of the 'Ballet Afri-

-

cains' and a number of other works of unquestionable artistic an d
socially redeeming significance."

-

-

- 5 -

-

In affirming, the CA majority agreed with the DC
that appellees had demonstrated a probability of success
on the merits.

In LaRue, supra, 409 U.S., at 118, this

Court had stressed that the state stacute there upheld did
not prohibit provocative entertainment "across-the-board."
The ordinance here is that type of total prohibition and

·-------

could not survive.

The majority noted that it did not have

to decide whether the actual dancing involved in appellees'
establishments was protected expression, s~nce even if it
were not appellees would have standing to attack an overly
broad statute like this one on First Amendment grounds.

-

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611 (1971).
601, 612 (1973).

See also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.

On the Younger issue, the majority found

that the two appellees who had not been prosecuted by the local
authorities were in the same position as the appellees in
414 Theater Corp. v. Murphy, 499 F.2d 1155 (CA 2 1974), where
a preliminary injunction was upheld on the rationale that
Younger did not apply to cases in which state prosecutions were
not pending when the federal actions were brought.

M & L Rest

presented a more difficult question, since neither Younger nor
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), addressed the situation
where the state prosecution began shortly after the federal
action was filed.

-

Steffel was written in terms of no state

prosecution pending at the time of the federal decision on the
merits.

Here, however, several factors indicated that a

-

-

-

- 6 -

Younger dismissal was not appropriate.

First, it would

be anomaloui to grant relief to two plaintiffs but to
deny it to a third "because of subsequent events largely
out of its control . . • " (emphasis i~ original), especially
if there might be contradictory results as a consequence.
Second, judicial energy would be conserved by having the
f e deral court which would decide the same issues as to two
plaintiffs decide them also for the third.

Third, the lower

federal courts are the prime protectors of federal rights, a
factor which would tip any balance toward exercising federal
jurisdiction.

-

Finally, a rule that the court, whether state

or federal, first presented with an issue would be able to
continue on to the merits would be a clear and equitable
guide in Younger situations.

This rule w6uld save time and

foster speedier decisions on the merits; though it might
encourage races to different courthouses, it would guard
against attempts by state officials to dispossess a federal
court of jurisdiction by initiating a prosecution, and would
ensure that there would be no federal intervention subsequent
to the beginning of a state prosecution if the latter were
started first.
Judge Lumbard dissented on the Younger question.

There

were none of the special circumstances under Younger justifying

-

{(

federal intervention.

A rule relying solely on priority in

filing would be a departure from traditional federal equity
practice, would encourage a race to begin actions in the

-

-

-
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different courts, and would not serve the delicate balance
of federalism which Younger was designed to foster and
which requires an analysis of the particular factors present
'

in each case.

Under the facts of this case, federal - state

comity was not served by restraining the local officials from
prosecuting M & L Rest.

As to the other two appellees, the

action against M & L might be dispositive of their claims.
The state courts should be given an opportunity to give a
narrow, saving construction to the ordinance.

Steffel was not

on point, since it did not address the question of injunctive
relief against threatened and pending state prosecutions.

__

414 Theater Corp., supra, also presented a very different factual

\

setting and considerations.

Appellees could seek federal relief

later, if it developed that the state prosecution was not proceeding sufficiently quickly or that they were being harassed by
the prosecution.
3.

CONTENTIONS:
a.

Appellants contend that the ordinance was a

permissible exercise of the police power, mich like zoning, with
deference to the legislative judgment being appropriate.
b.

Appellants also argue that the courts below did

not correctly apply the rule of Younger.

They mention but do

not stress the notion that a saving construction was precluded b y
the failure of the federal courts to abstain.

~

4.

DISCUSSION:

The Younger controversy presented by

this case contains two elements which this Court has not yet

-

decided.

- 8 -

-

First, this Court has not yet reached the question

of whether the "special circumstances" for federal injunctive
relief required by Younger when a state prosecution is pending
are also required when the state prosecution is only threatened.
See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 820 n. 15 (1974); Steffel,
supra, 415 U.S., at 475.

CA 2 found that there was sufficient

i rreparable inj ury indicated to call for the preliminary injunction, but it made no finding of Younger special circumstances.
Second, this Court has never indicated how ~he Younger rule is
affected by state prosecutions begun after the filing of the
federal action but prior to any granting of relief or decision on

-

the merits.

But cf. Steffel, supra, 415 U.S., at 478 (MR. JUSTICE

WHITE, concurring).

This issue would be better presented if there

_. were not other plaintiffs not subject to similar state prosecutions.

The four rationales given by the CA majority for not dis-

missing as to M & L Rest are debatable.

The strongest consideratb:

supporting the majority is the fact that two other parties would
still have a federal forum for the same claims raised by the third ;
Judge Lumbard's suggestion that the other two parties await the
decision of the state court in the criminal prosecution would be
difficult to follow here, since, as the CA majority concluded, the
ordinance in question seems both clear and precise in its overbreadth.

Zwickler v. Keota, 389 U.S.. 241, 249-250 (1967).

The CA

majority's suggestion of a rule that priority in time in filin g a

-

lawsuit should control as to whether a state prosecution will be
considered pending or not does seem to cut against the flex ibili ty

-

-

-

- 9 -

which Younger would appear to require in protecting the
interests in comity and federalism.
Of the Younger cases now before the Court, the closest
'

one to this case is Cryan v. Hamar Theatres, Inc., No. 73-711.
That case does involve a situation in which only one of the
named plaintiffs may not have a pending state prosecution
against it for Younger purposes.

That case is complicated by

its nature as a class action, a factor given great stress by
the District Court, and by the fact that the injunctive relief
given was prospective only.

Though the issues in Cryan · and in

this one are not identical, they may be sufficiently related to

-

make ·it desirable to hold this case for the disposition of
Cryan.

The latter, however, now is under some suspicion of

mootness.
On the merits, the decisions of the CA and DC as to the
overbreadth of an ordinance proscribing non-obscene nudity when
occurring in any public place is very supportable.

Cf. Miller

v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25-26 & n. 8 (1973).
There is no response.
11/8/74
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DORAN
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Appeal from CA 2
(Oakes, Timbers;
Lumbard, dissenting)
Federal/Civil

Untimely
(non-jurisdictional)

In the preliminary memo prepared for this case,
there was a failure to discuss the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court and any possible difficulties.

The only

possible problem is with finality; this Court has not yet
decided whether finality is a requirement under§ 1254(2).
See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 501-503 (1965);

-

7B Moore, Federal Practice JC-360.1-361 (2d Ed. 1974); Stern
& Gressman, at 32.

Since the DC and CA both held the ordinance

-

-

- 2

unconstitutional as overly broad on its face, and since
the CA found that resps had standing to attack the
ordinance, regardless of whether a more narrowly written
'

ordinance would have permissibly proscribed the conduct at
resps' establishments, it would appear that the decision

0-c(
f/

below is sufficiently final both for jurisdictional purposes
and for ripeness for review.
~

&

s.~.

See City of Chicago v. A., T.,

R. Co., 357 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1958).
If the Court were to find that the appeal was im-

providently taken, the papers would be treated as a petition
for a writ of certiorari.

-

28 U.S.C.

§

2103.

But by my

calculations, the filing of the papers would be untimely by
one day, a jurisdictional defect in the case of a petition
-- for cert in a civil case.

The CA decision was handed down on

June 25, 1974, but the papers were filed here on September 25,
1974.
11/11/74
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TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Joel Klein

3 . ~~~ .

a;..~~

U-~~~ .

DATE:

~~lit.>

-~

j;

~
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(~~

I
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, Inc.
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~

- - ~ •

)~~
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is usual in cases of this sort, the briefs a re l a rgely

~ ~less on the legal issues.

~~?

~ ,Lo

c~J,, ~ ~

No. 74-337, Doran v. Sal~

!/-

~J.41~

J\oril ll~ 1975 ?2-G.t--j_. ~

Nevertheless, in large measure,

.
----resolution
of these issues turns on application of rather

-:s~,&/,-f-~ C!r

well-settled principles.

~ -.. - . -vr~,,,- .
. ~J,.,.

F or the reasons below I would

that you vote to affirm the decision below, with

recommend.

~ Hu-I-L one modification.
t.-1..--

~ ( . . ,~

-

r

the enactment of the challenged ordinance which,

among other things, prohibited topless dancing in all bars,
the three respondents in this case clothed their dancers.

~ .~k

~ They then sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal
~

district court, claiming that their dancers were engaged in

~

constitutionally protected activity and therefore that
(
.
~~ the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied and on its

--

~~
~ ~
face.

The federal complaint was filed on August 9, 1~

~

and, on that day, USDC refused to issue a TRO.

~~

day, one of respondents, . M&L Rest., Inc., reinstituted

tr>--d

4

I

~

~

-

t~

,

The following

- - - ~
-----

cing.

Criminal charges were filed against M&L

,k ~ and its dancers for eight successive violations of the

~ ordinance.
-

The other two respondents continued to keep their

LA----f:z+:Z:( dancers clothed.
-~~
~

1

i _ssued a _ relimina

Prior to M&L's trial in state court, USDC
injunction against enforcement of the

O'f- ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~

/J-i.+1~ ~ ) .

--

· -·

~ 4 . . f - - ,,J ~~~~~

~/

("

.

.J ,.,._._.,.___

~

\t

•

-

-

-

2.

ordinance, finding the ordinance oberbroad and further finding
irreparable economic injury to respondents from its potential
enforcement.
1.

It seems clear to me that at the time respondents
'--

------

filed their action in federal court, the court had jurisdiction and the controversy was justiciable.

Both Steffel

and your Ellis v. Dyson opinion compel such findings.

There

can be no doubt that the ordinance had a real deterrent
effect on respondents who immediately clothed their dancers.
Hence the immin~ncy was at least as great as in Steffel.
However, respondents asserted in their complaint, that their

-

activities were protected by the First Amendment.

Indeed, it

I

seems that respondents did precisely what prudent and
responsible businessmen should do in this situation.

Rather

than continue topless dancing, which certainly would have
resulted in a criminal prosecution, in order to test the
constitutionality of the ordinance in a state prosecution,
respondents forebore from engaging in the prescribed activity.
But this should ' not mean that they are without remedy to
test the validity of the ordinance.

Perhaps they could

have tested the ordinanee in a state declaratory action, but
it is well settled that in this circumstante respondents
~

have a choice of fora and need not file in state court simply
because a declaratory remedy is available.

-

Koota, 389 U.S. at 248.

See Zwickler v.

You explicitly accepted this aspect

-

-

-

3.

of Zwickler in your Lake Carriers dissent, 406 U.S. at 516.
2.

Given the facts that there was jurisdiction for a

federal action at the outset, the next question is what effect
the criminal actions filed against M&L would have.

I would

think that under Younger the federal court should have dismissed the action against M&L.

The state criminal action

against M&L was commenced one day after the filing of the
federal complaint.

At this time, no real action, in particular

no hearings, had been taken in federal court.

As you note

in your memorandum on No. 74-156, Hicks v. Miranda, the key
fact for Younger purposes should be the possibility of

-

"duplicative proceedings" in state and federal court.
also Justice White's concurrence in Steffel.

See

Thus I would

hold· that prior to the commencement of hearings in federal
court, a state initiated prosecution requires the federal
court to relinguish jurisdiction.*
·A-Despite this conclu~"ion I think it fair to note that
there is some force fo the argument that the filing of the
complaint in federal court be the determinative date.
Otherwise a state can defeat a federal jurisdiction simply
be instituting a criminal action. This would seem to be in
tne nature of bad faith, however, and I would not attribute
such motives to the state. In any event, the interests at
stake in Younger, particularly the primac y of the state's
interest in unencumbered enforcement of its criminal laws,
leads me to use the duplicative proceedings approach.

-

'r--

-

-

-

4.

I am particularly convinced of this conclusion in the
present case.

M&L voluntarily refrained from using topless

dancers so as to avoid a criminal prosecution.

Immediately
C

after it filed its federal complaint, however, it recomme+
the proh ibited

behavior.

d

To allow M&L's federal case to

conti nue in these circumstances would mean that the filing
of the federal complaint would act as a shield against criminal
prosecution.

This is a wholly tmde s irable result.

If M&L

wan t s a federal court ruling on the ordinance it should,
at the very least, continue to refrain from allegedly criminal
behavior pending the federal court disposition of the case.
Although I think CA2 was wrong with respect to M&L, I

-

nonetheless believe that the federal case against the other

---

two respondents in this case should have been allowed to go
,~ - - - - - - - - - -

forward.

-

These parties did not recommence topless dancing

--

upon filing their federal complaint.

=

Rather, they continued

to refrain pending resolution of their claim.

I can see

no reason for penalizing those respondents who acted properly
solely because a third respondent misbehaved.

Thus, I would

find that Younger only required dismissal of M&L's federal

)

suit.
The dismissal of M&L's suit, and the concommitant

-

state criminal prosecution against it, does, however, raise

-

-----

uestion of whether the federal courts shoul d have

~~

abstained pending resolution of the state prosecution.

~

the

-

-

-

5.

Abstantion, as you are well aware, is a far less rigorous
doctrine than Younger and provides for considerably more
federal court discretion.

In the circumstances of this case

I would say that abstantion was not required.
The state prosecution had been filed, but no proceedings
had commenced, at the time the federal court ruled . Thus,
abstantion probable would have necessitated a rather long
wait for an authoritative construction of the local ordinance.

iJ./

Indeed, an intermediate N.Y. appellate court had already
upheld an ordinance similar to the one at issue here; thus,
it appeared that an authoritative limiting instruction likely
would have to await two appeals, as well as a full trial.

I

This could easily occupy a year or even more.

In the meantime

respondents would be unable to use topless dancers.

The result,

-

according to respondent's uncontroverted affidavits, would
be a usignificant economic loss.

As you noted with approval

in Lake Carriers', the Court has often been concerned about
"the delay and expense to which application of the abstention
doctrine inevitably gives rise."
375 U.S. at 418.

England v. Medical Examiners,

Indeed, your Lake Carriers' dissent strongly

suggests that abstention is improper here.

In Lake Ca,•i::-riers' • I/

much as here, an important federal issue was at stake and the
costs to the parties of awaiting a more deliberate and
cumbersome state court adjudication counselled against federal
abstention.

-

lt/

Likewise, in Steffel, the Court relying on the

-

-

-

6.

•a bortion cases, pointed out that the "pending prosecution of
petitioner's handbilling companion does not affect petitioner's

I/ [federal]

action for declaratory relief."

415 U.S. at 471.

Thus, the present case appears to be on all fours with Steffel
in this regard and I would hold that abstention was not required /

~~

with respect to the two respondents who did not reinstitute
topless dancing.*
3.

Assuming there was federal jurisdiction with respect

-

to two of these respondents, the next question is whether
the exercise of federal equitable powers to grant a preliminary
injunction in this case was appropriate.

-

~

This issue was

explicitly left open in Steffel, 415 U.S. at 463, although ~ ~
there is some peripheral discussion of the issue in Justice ~
White's and Justice Rehnquist's concurrences.

1
1

~

In my opinion

the grant of injunctive relief was entirely appropriate in
this case.
Typically in an action such as this one a plaintiff
will re quest both injunctive and declaratory relief, and

I .,,,,-vv,. - -

*To be sure as a practical matter, this suggestion makes
my earlier suggestion that the case against M&L be dismissed
, largely irrelevant in this case. Nevertheless
I think the general issue of when a subsequently-filed
state prosecution requires dismissal of a federal action
is an important issue that may and should be resolved in
this case. I gather the issue will not be decided in
}
Hicks v. Miranda. If it is, Hi cks will control this aspect
of the present case.

-

.,Y-...

U-

-f-)

-

-

7.

usually declaratory relief will be adequate to protect the
plaintiff's constitutional rights.

JI

Contrary to Justice

Rehnquist's concurrence in Steffel, I do not think state
courts should be free to ignore federal declaratory judgments
with impunity.

Comity is a two-way street.

And when a federal

~
a state court were not
the declaratory judgment
might well issue an injunction in aid of its jurisdiction.
.-;;,

Thus, the distinction between injunctive and declaratory
relief is

---------------------largely a matter of form. Nevertheless it is
~

·

form. worth preserving because

it7 r:ss

C

a

abrasive to issue a

decla ratory judgment instead of an injunction.
Had this case gone to final judgment below I assume
that, much as in Steffel, both an injunction and a declaratory
judgment would have been issued.

In that circumstance I would

suggest vacating the injunction.*

But this case has not gone

to final judgment; the decision on certiorari is a preliminary
ig_junction.

1

At that stage of the litigation, of course, the

court could not have issued a declaratory judgment since the
sole effect of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the
status quo pending resolution of the ultimate issue.
In this case the factors justifying an injunctive remedy

-

clearly supported respondents.

They had been using topless

*Steffel, himsel~ did not appeal the denial of injunctive
relief.

-

-

-

8.

dancers for several years prior to the enactment of the
instant ordinance.

Moreover, according to their affidavi~s,

~~~ ~
~~-~
ncethef

)__d~.

they were suffering substantial economic inJuryl

could not recover for this injury from the state, this would
be a :lear

~

of irreparable injury.

On the other

hand petitioner would not be seriously hampered if, in effect,
the effective date of its ordinance were delayed for several
months.

Frankly, under standard equity principles, as applied

by this Court, I can see no reason for not allowing injunctive
relief in this situation.

In short, I would make it clear that

in an action such as the present one preliminary injunctive

)

relief is appropriate only when the plaintiff can demonstrate

-

irreparable injury.*
4.

Finally I turn to the merits.

As usual this is

probably the least interesting part of the case.

I would hold

either that the ordinance is invalid on its face or that it
cannot be applied to topless dancers unless it is tied into
a valid liquor licensing provision ,
v. LaRue.
At the outset let me n ~

as it was in .caiifornia
~

~

.J/ _
f""jll'wJ..

o..J-

) several important ·· ~·

distinctions between the present ordinance and the statute
*If you disagree with me about the propriety of injunctive
relief in this case, you should reverse and remand making
it clear that under Steffel declaratory relief would still
be appropriate.

-

~

-

at issue in La Rue.

-

9.

-/ta./-

The critical difference, of course, is

the La Rue statute was a liquor licensing provision.
Court relied heavily on the broad power of the

The

s~

B"t..a t aes

the 21st Amendment to license the selling of liquor.*

under
In

this case no effort is made to tie the ordinance to li~ or
licensing.

On the contrary this ordinance plainly applies

--

to dance halls, and other establishments not selling liquor.
......,___

The present case also differs from La Rue
important respects.

,_

in two less

First, the ordinance applies to topless

dancing; the LaRue statute did not include topless dancing
but applied only to bottomless dancing and certain forms of
simulated sexual activity.

-

Second, in La Rue there was

evidence of pros titution, violence and the like) surrounding
these bars; in this case there is evidence of noise and litter,
but no evidence of the kind of ancillary problems presented
in La Rue.
In these circumstances
that topless dancing
To be sure there are very few First Amendment i nterests at
issue in topless dancing but, as La Rue suggests, 409 U.S.

~
~I

at 118, the constitutional interests are not wholly negligible.
In this situation the standard announced in United States v.

-

k'J'h.e record does not indicate why the=
nce is not
ti~
to alcohol regulation. It may o e that this is a
local ordinance whereas the state generally controls
alcohol licenses.

-

,

-

-

O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, is appropriate.

10.
That standard

allows for regulation of conduct that has some small expressive
element if "it furthers an impor~ant or substantia l governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is tmrelated to the
suppression of free ~xercise; and if the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment ~reedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest."
~~

I do not think this standard is satisfied here.

-----------.---

petitioner claims that it is interested in regulati~

Although
noise,

litter and the like, these goals can be readily accomplished
through other means that do not infringe on the "speech"
interest.

-

In candor, the ordinance is a morality regulation,

a part of the great obscenity parade.

As such I think it has

_______________________________

.....__ place in a bar that caters to consenting adults .
no

It seems

to me to be arrogant, to say the least, to suggest that topless
dancers in a ballet troupe are entitled to constitutional 1~~
~

°'-'

protection whereas the same women

infdiscotheque

are not.

~

~7:

The decision as to what is "culture" should be l e ft to the
consumer unless the activities goes beyond the limits of
obscenity.
Not only do I think the ordinance is tmconstitutional
as a pplied to topless dancing, I also think it is manifestly
overbroad.

It prohibits topless women in any "public place"

which is defined so as to include theatres.

-

As we discussed

in the Hair case, the mere presence of an exposed breast

~

-

-

r

-

11.

cannot constitutionally justify proscription of a legitimate
theatrical production.

Petitioners suggest that this over-

breadth problem can be cured by limiting the statute to
places like bars and cabarets and thereby exclude threares
from its coverage.

This suggestion flies in the face of the

ordinance's language; but even as so construed the ordinance
is ov rbroad~ •. ~~s, nightclubs and cabarets also on occasion
~

i ay

orJ}i~

s.

The mere exi stence of a nude breast

in such a presentation cannot justify its pros cription.
It would appear to be a toss-up as to whether to strike
down the ordinance as applied to topless dancing or for
facial invalidity.

-

I can understand a reluctance to

dignify topless dancing by calling it protected speech and
thus an overbreadth ruling might be preferable.

On the

other hand I am aware of your aversion to overbreadth analysis
and that would suggest invalidation of the ordinance as
applied.

On balance I would probably take the as applied

--------------I think topless

approach here.

dancing should be protected

~

in adult ~only bars and I think the Court should continue to
move slowly in overbreadth analysis so that Broadrick is not H
substantially eroded.

J.K.
ss

-

,'(r

also note that after the ov·e rbreadth decision below
petitioners enacted another ordin ance, only this time they

L~ )

-.

-

-

-

.

-

-

limited it to "cabarets, bars, lounges, dance halls,
discotheques, restaurants or coffee shops." The federal
district court also invalidated this statute. Salem Inn,
Inc. v. Frank, 381 F.Supp. 859. The appeal before CA2 has
been held pending this case. Thus, if the Court issues an
overbreadth opinion along the lines written by CA2 in this
case - that is, one that turns on the "public place" aspect
of the present ordinance - the issue certainly will be right
back up here. And, as I have said, I would find that, even
as limited in its recent ordinance, petitioners cannot
regulate topless dancing absent the tie-in to liquor
licensing as required in LaRue.

)1-.

•

-

•
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Several Issues

1.

Justiciability?

2.

Younger.

~~
J..Nv, . (

Yes.' under Steffel and Dyson. ~ . . , . .

At time federal suit was instituted on

Aug. 9, 1973, the three respondents had clothed their dancers.
But next day, M&L resumed topless performances.

State criminal

charges were filed vs. M&L prior to hearing in federal court.
Younger applies to M&L. (;..

3.

Abstention:
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~
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After state prosecution commenced,

possibly federal court should have abstained.

-
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litigation might take year or more. Meanwhile, "irreparable
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Could hold ordinance overbroad (ordinance

applied to all public places - including stage), or could
hold ordinance invalid as applied to inhibit whatever "speech"
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interest may be involved, or cruld s u stain ordinance as valid
exercise of police power (although I'm not su inclined).
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 10, 1975

Re:

No. 74-337 - Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc,

Dear Bill:
At least · on the first go around, I agree
with your memorandum in this case except that I
wish you would ~eserve the qu~stion whether if
after getting tneir aec l arttf5Fy judgment that
the ordinance is unconstitutional, as you say
they may, Salem and Tim-Rob are prosecuted under
the ordinance, the federal court may enjoin the
prosecution.
Sincerely,

frMr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to Conference
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Mr, Justice White
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Justioe Karshall

Kr. Justice Blacklnun
llr. Juat1oe Powell

STYLISTIC CHANGES

From: Rehrw1U t?.t9

,1_.,,.

Ciroula.ted:i_ _ _ _ _ _.,,_.
2nd DRAFT

Reoir~uls.teM

(i; j,, \15

~

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74--337
Frank Doran, Etc., ]On Appeal from the United
Appellant,
States Court of Appeals for the
v.
Second Circuit.
Salem Inn, Inc., et al.

~

1-1-f
~

( I It,

[June -, 1975]
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST.
Appellants are lQ_cal law enforce_m.fillt oflici.a.ls in N as.sau
County, New York, wh o were preliminarily ,en iom&.d by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York from enforcing a local ,2rdinance of the
town of North i'Iempsteact. Yalem 1 nn, Inc. v. Frank,
364 F. Supp. 478 (1973), aff'd, 501 F. 2d 18 ( 1974). In
addition to defending the ordinance on the merits, they
contend that the complaint should have been dismissed
on the authority of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37
( 1971) , and its companion cases.
Appellees are three corporations which operate bars at
various locations within the town. Prior to enactment
of the ordinance in question, each provided topless dancing as entertainment for its customers. On July 17,
1973, the town enacted Local Law No. 1-1973, an ordinance making it unlawful for bar owners and others to
permit waitresses, barmaids, and entertainers to appear
in their ~ ablishments with breasts uncovered or so
thinly draped as to appear uncovered. Appellees complied with the ordinance by clothing their dancers in
bikini tops, but on August 9, 1973, brought this action
in the District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. They
alleged that the ordinance violated their rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

·~-•C~ ~

b

~~9
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-
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Constitution. Their pleadings sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and declaratory relief. The prayer for a temporary restraining
order was denied instanter, but the motion for preliminary injunction was set for a hearing on August 22,
1973.
On August 10, the day after the appellees' complaint
was filed, and their application for a temporary restraining order denied, one of them, M
est., Inc., resumed
its briefly-suspended presentation of topless ancing.
On that day, and each of the three succeeding days,
M & L and its topless dancers were served with criminal
summonses based on violation of the ordinance:1 These
summonses were returnable before the Nassau County
Court on September 13, 1973. The other two appellees,
Salem Inn, Inc., and Tim-Rob Bar. Inc. , did not resume
the presentation of topless entertainment in their bars
until after the District Court issued its preliminary
injunction.
On September 5, 1973, appellant Doran filed an answer
which alleged that a criminal prosecution had been
instituted against at least one of the appellees ; the
District Court was urged to "refuse to exercise jurisdiction" and to dismiss the complaint.
On September 6, 1973, on the basis of oral argument
and memoranda of law, the District Court entered an
opinion and order in which it lr["found] that (1) Local
Law No. 1-1973 of the Town of J\f'or'th Hempstead is on
its face violative of plaintiffs' First Amendment rightsin that it prohibits across the board nonobscene condllct
in the form of topless dancing, and (2) that the daily
penalty of $500 for each violation of the ordinance, theprior state court decision validating a similar ordinance,
1
The ordinance provides that each day's violation constitutes a
separate offense.

C),,__~/~
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the overbreadth of the ordinance, and the potential harm
to plaintiffs' business by its enforcement justify the
federal intervention and injunctive relief." 364 F. Supp.,
at 483. The court concluded by enjoining appellants
"pending the final determination of this action ... from
prosecuting the plaintiffs for any violation of Local Law
No. 1-1973 .. . or in any way interfering with their
activities which may be prohibited by the test of said
Local Law." Ibid. The court did address appellants'
Younger contention, .but held that the pending prosecution against M & L did not affect the availability of
injunctive relief to Salem and Tim-Rob. As for M & L,
it concluded that if federal relief were granted to two
of the appellees, "it would be anomalous" not to extend
it to M & L as well. Id., at 482.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,
It held that the "ordinance would have to fall," 501 F.
2d, at 21, and that the claim of deprivation of constitutional rights and diminution of business warranted the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals rejected appellants' claim that the District Court
ought to have dismissed appellees' complaint on the
authority of Younger v. Harris, supra, and its companion
cases. As to Salem and Tim-Rob, Younger did not present a bar because there had at no time been a pending
prosecution against them under the ordinance. As for
M & L, the court thought that it posed "a slightly different problem," 501 F. 2d, at 22, since the state prosecution was begun only one day after the filing of appellees'
complaint in the District Court. The court recognized
that this situation was not squarely covered by either
Yo11,nger or Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974),
but concluded that the interests of avoiding contradictory outcomes, of conservation of judicial energy, and
of a clear-cut method for determining when federal

~c~
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courts should defer to state prosecutions, all militated
in favor of granting relief to all three appellees.
We ~ al first with a preliminary j urisdictional matter.
This appeal was taken unaer 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2),
which provides this Court with appellate jurisdiction at
the behest of a party relying on a state Rtatute held
unconstitutional by a Court of Appeals.2 There is
authority, questioned but never put to rest, that § 1254
(2) is available only when review is sought of a final
judgment. Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188 (1929) ;
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351
U. S. 901 (1956). But see Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka
& Sarnta Fe R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 82--83 (1958). The
present a122_eal, however, seeks review of the affirman~
ota ~ liminarr, i11iunction. We also are less than
completely cer'tain that the Court of Appeals did in fact
hold Local Law 1-1978 to be unconstitutional, since it
considered the merits only for the purpose of ruling on
the propriety of preliminary injunctive relief. We need
not resolve these ·issues, which have neither been briefed
nor argued, because we in any event have certiorari
jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 2103. As we have previously done in an identical situation, El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497, 502-503 (1965), we dismiss the
appeal and, treating the papers as a petition for certiorari, grant the writ of certiorari.
Turning to the Younger issues raised by petitioners,
we conclu,de that Y oun[_er and Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U. S. 66 ( 1971), are applicable to all aspects of the complaint excep!__thiprayers for declaratory relief by the
two~ 1~ ~er'"than l\i & L.3 Respondent M & L
or the purposes of § 1254 (2) , local ordinances are treated as
state statutes. See, e. g., Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
R . Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958) .
a Respondents urge in defense of their judgment that even if the
case is controlled by the principles of Younger and Samuels v.

~~

~-

~---

~

~

~

~~-t-~
-1,. J« .f.
/..,-

~~~~

~

~

J4v_,~
~Ii,~
~-?-~

-

'14-331-Mfil.'IO

DORAN v. SALEM INN, INC.

5

eould have pursued the course taken by the other respondents following the denial of their request for a
temporary restraining order. Had it done so, it would
not have subjected itself to prosecution for violation of
the ordinance in the state court. When the criminal summonses issued against M & L on the dayi; immediately
following the filing of the federal complaint, the federal
litigation was in an embryonic stage and no contested
matter had been decided. In this posture, the District
Court should have considered M & L's prayer for injunctive relief to be governed by Younger. The fact that'
the remaining respondents may be in a different position
were their claims to be treated separately is not enough
to overcome the prinriples enunciated in that case.
We held in Steffel v. Thompson, supra, that a party
who was not th e subject of a pending state proceeding
might have his federal claim for declaratory relief adjudicated by a federal court. We there reserved, as we had
done in Younger, 401 U. S., at 41, the question of
whether the principles of Younger govern when such a
party seeks an injunction against the enforcement of a
state statute. 415 U.S., at 463. If Salem and Tim-Rob
had no connection with M & L, they would present this
question in its full scope. But there was in fact a close
relationship between them and M & L; they had joined
in the same complaint in the District Court challenging
the ordinance, and had appeared through the same counMackell, they may obtain injunctive and declaratory relief because
of the presence of the requisite special circumstances. See Y CYUnger
v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 53-54 (1971) . In particular, they claim
t hat M & L was the subj ect of "repetitive ha.rassing criminal
prosecutions aimed at suppressing the expressive activity carried on"
at that bar. Brief for Appellees 35. The District Court did not
have occasion to consider this issue, and we decline to do so on the
basis of t he spare record before us. The issue is thus left open on
remand.

~
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sel. We agree with the Court of Appeals that contradictory outcomes in litigation raising seemingly identical
issues and growing out of the same set of facts are to be
avoided, especially when the result may be to allow state
criminal prosecutions to proceed against some participants in the events but not against others. We believe,
however, that the way to avoid such a result in this
situation is to bar the remaining respondents, as well as
M & L, from access to federal injunctive relief. We thus
answer in the affirmative art of the uestion res rved
e el, that of whether Y ou11qer is apin Youn er an
pli~ ble w~en iQj unctiverelief is S2,!tght by a party
against wTi~ ! ] ~ nQ_P.J;.!ld.b:uu.t.ate 2,roceedings.
The District Court was therefore wrong in granting a
preliminary injunction to any of the three respondents,
and in failing to dismiss their complaint insofar as it
sought permanent injunctive relief, without making findings that federal intervention was justified under
Younger. There remains the question of District Court
jurisdiction to render the declaratory judgment which
the complaint also sought.
As to M & L, we see no reason for not concluding that
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 ( 1971) , is controlling
even though the state prosecution was commenced the
day following the filing of the federal complaint. The
case differs from Steffel v. Thompson, supra, because
once the state prosecution was commenced, M & L was
no longer without a forum in which to litigate its constitutional contentions. Having violated the ordinance,
rather than awaiting the normal development of its federal action, it cannot now be heard to complain that
those contentions are being resolved in a state court.
We also note that when an injunction against a state
proceeding is unavailable under Younger, it would beplainly wasteful and inefficient to conduct a federal

I
~

~ ~~

~+<:::,
~~
~
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declaratory judgment action dealing with the same constitutional contentions which are at issue in a concurrent
state prosecution involving the same parties. Cf.
Younger v. Harris, supra, at 44.
With regard to the other two respondents, we could,. •
of course, conclude that because of their close relationship with M & L they too should ordinarily be barred
from obtaining declaratory relief, just as we concluded
that they were ordinarily barred from injunctive relief.
For the reasons set forth in Steff el, however, we conclude
that the two remedies should be treated differentlyo
Were we to"'lioTd- otiierw1se,Saiem a;i Tim-R ob could
be left with the choice of risking criminal prosecution or
foregoing activities they believe to be protected during
the pendency of a criminal pro~cution which does not
directly involve them, which may be so entangled in
other issues that the constitutional contentions are resolved only after considerable delay, and which may in
fact be disposed of on grounds unrelated to the constitutional contentions. The District Court's jurisdiction to
issue a declaratory judgment at the behest of these
parties was therefore not subject to the restraints of
Samuels v. Mackell.4
The appeal to the Court of Appeals in this case was
taken after the issuance of a preliminary injunction
"pending the final determination of this action." While
the District Court's discussion of the constitutional issues
was in language which leaves no doubt that it considers·
Local Law 1-1973 to be invalid, it did not in fact issue,

l

4 We do not intend our disposition of this or any other issuein this case to bear on the showing which must be made by a
party who has obtained a favorable declaratory judgment in order'
to thereafter obtain a federal court injunction against subsequent
prosecution. Compare Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 477-47g(1974) (WHITE, J. , concunimg),, with id., at 480-483 (REHNQUIST,,
J ., concurring}.

-
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a declaratory judgment. Because there is no declaratory
judgment to be reviewed, and because we have concluded
that the District Court should not have granted injunctive relief, absent a showing of Younger's exceptional
circumstances, we have no occasion to reach the merits.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.

I agree with the Court that the District Court
erroneously granted preliminary relief to respondent

M & L, which, after filing its federal complaint, ceased
compliance with the challenged ordinance and was there1
I am not in accord
after prosecuted in state court.
with today's decision, however., insofar as it disapproves
the preliminary injunctions granted to respondents
Salem Inn and Tim-Rob, neither of which was in violation
of the ordinance or was being prosecuted iu state court.
In declining to affirm the injunction, the Court
emphasizes that "there was in fact a close relationship
between [these respondents] and M & L; they had joined
in the same complaint in District Court challenging the

•

•

2.

ordinance, and had appeared through the same counsel."
~ at 5.

I do not think this relationship is relevant.

Unlike the situation in Hicks v. Miranda, No. 74-156
June

-

, 1975), where

'

as the Court held, all of the
.

concerned parties were in privity and therefore could
protect their interests in the state proceeding involving
some of them, there is no reason to believe that M & L
could protect the interests of the other respondents
which, rather than being in privity with M & L, are its
competitors.

In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 n.

19 (1974), we held that the existence of a state prosecution
against Steffel's companion, who had participated with him
in the proscribed behavior, did not bar Steffel's federal
action.

Similarly, it seems to me that the existence of

the state prosecution against M & L should have no effect
on the propriety of federal relief for the remaining
2

respondents.

Moreover, if the Court were correct in

suggesting that the relationship between M & Land the
other two respondents should bar injunctive relief for all
respondents, I see no reason, and the Cou~~ suggests none,
for then holding that the relationship does not also bar
declaratory relief for Salem Inn and Tim-Rob.
Nor do I think that the propriety of preliminary
relief for Salem Inn and Tim-Rob is controlled by Younge r

-

-

3.

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Samuels v. Mackell,
401 U.S. 66 (1971).

The principle underlying those cases

is that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate
constitutional claims, and therefore a federal court should,
in all but the most exceptional circumstances, refuse to
interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding.

In

the absence of an ongoing state proceeding, however, as
we recognized in Steffel v. Thompson, supra, a plaintiff may
challenge the constitutionality of a state statute in federal
court, assuming he can satisfy the requirements of federal
jurisdiction.

See also Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan,

406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972).
No state proceedings were pending against Salem Inn
and Tim-Rob.

Nor was there any question that they satis-

fied the requirement of federal jurisdiction.

The Court

recognizes that these respondents are entitled to declaratory
relief if they prevail on the merits.

Thus, the narrow

question in this case is whether they are entitled to a
preliminary injunction, prohibiting enforcement of the
ordinance against them, pending the ultimate disposition
of the case.

I would answer this question in the affirmative.

The Court has previously recognized that "ordinarily
the practical effect of [injunctive and declaratory] relief
will be virtually identical."

Samuels v. Mackell, supra,

-

401 U.S. at 73.

4.

In either case the decision is a binding

resolution of the dispute between the parties protecting
the federal plaintiff, if the judgment is in his favor,
against future prosecution in state court.

See Samuels

v. Mackell, supra, 401 U.S. at 72; Steffel v. Thompson,
supra, 415 U.S., at 476 (White, J., concurring).

Moreover,

both remedies bar enforcement of the contested statute or
ordinance only with respect to the federal plaintiffs;
the state is free to prosecute others who are in violation.
Generally, at the conclusion of a successful federal
challenge to a state statute, a district court can fully
protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering
a declaratory judgment, and therefore an injunction is
unnecessary.

But, prior to final judgment, there is no

form of declaratory remedy comparable to a preliminary
injunction and, unless preliminary relief is available,
plaintiffs in some situations may suffer unnecessary and
substantial irreparable harm.
The traditional standard for granting a preliminary
injunction requires the plaintiff to show that otherwise
he will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is
likely to prevail on the merits.

In deciding whether to

grant a preliminary injunction, a federal court must weigh
carefully the interests on both sides.

Enjoining a state

statute allows the federal plaintiff to engage in the

-

•

5.

proscribed activity pending final resolution of his case.
Such a result seriously impairs the state's interest in
enforcing its criminal laws.

In these circumstances, a

federal court should grant a preliminary injunction only
when the plaintiff establishes that he will suffer
significant irreparable injury unless such relief is
afforded, and that he is highly likely to prevail on the
merits.
In the pr esent case respondents alleged, and petitioners
did not deny, that absent preliminary relief they would
suffer a substantial loss of business and perhaps even
bankruptcy.

Certainly the latter type of injury is sufficient

to justify int~rim relief; otherwise an ultimate judgment
for respondents would be useless.

Both the District Court

and the Court of Appeals agreed that respondents made a
sufficient showing of irreparable injury to justify interim
relief.

Although I think the question was close, I would

hold on the facts of this case that the decision was within
the discretion of the District Court.
The only question remaining is whether respondents
made a sufficient showing of the likelihood of ultimate
3
success on the merits.
Although the customary "bar
room" type of nude dancing may involve only the barest
minimum of protected expression, we recognized in

•

-

6.

California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972), that this
form of entertainment may be entitled to First Amendment
protection under some circumstances.

In LaRue, however,

we concluded that the broad powers of the states to regulate
the sale of liquor, conferred by the Twenty-First Amendment,
outweighed any First Amendment interest in nude dancing
and that a state therefore could bar such dancing as a
part of its liquor licensing program.

In the present case

petitioners' ordinance is not tied to liquor licensing
provisions and, indeed, it applies to places that do not
sell liquor.

Nor do petitioners raise any other legitimate

state interest that would overcome the presumptive constitutional protection afforded nude dancing in an
establishment that is open only to consenting adults.
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1969).
In these circumstances I would not disturb the conclusion
below that respondents have shown a substantial likelihood
4

of success on the merits.
Accordingly, finding the

requisites for granting a

a preliminary injunction to be satisfied, I would affirm
the judgment below with respect to Salem Inn and Tim-Rob.

1.

FOOTNOTES

-

I also agree that M & L's case should be remanded

for consideration of its claim of harassment and bad faith
prosecution by petitioners.
2.

Nor, for the reasons given in Steffel, do I think

the federal court should abstain in these circumstances.
See Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 513
(Powell, J., dissenting).

3.

Both courts below found such a likelihood.

The

District Court talked in terms of holding the ordinance
unconstitutional, but in the context of a preliminary
injunction the court must have intended to refer only to
the likelihood that respondents ultimately would prevail.
The Court of Appeals properly clarified this point.

F.2d, a t _
4. Since I conclude that respondents have made an
adequate showing of success on their challenge to the
ordinance as applied, I do not consider their attack on
the facial validity of the statute.

v.

'/t'.:

'

·-

\

1

•~

>

·.c·

:,..\,

4,

.,,,.,

-,

..

.,.

.
-.,

'°""~J~~

J,,,1..-.~~~ .....

•s-----.~

r

'~

-

-

lik

~

( '7

~dAA-)

/~/vuJ...-<)__.R .

1st DRAFr

I t ~ \ J

-;:;;-~

N:~ :: UNITED ~TATES ~
7

SUPREME COURT

Frank Doran, Etc., )
Appellant,
On Appeal from the United
v.
States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
S a1em I nn, I nc., et a1.
[June - , 1975]

MR. JusTI CE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the District Court erroneously granted preliminary relief to m,pondent M & L,
which, after filing its federal complaint, ceased compliance with the challenged ordinance and was thereafter
prosecuted in state court. 1 I am not in accord with
today's decision, however, insofar as it disapproves the
preliminary injunctions granted to respondents Salem
Inn and Tim-Rob, neither of which was in violation of
the ordinance or was being prosecuted in state court.
In declining to affirm the injunction, the Court emphasizes that "there was in fact a close relationship
between [these respondents] and M & L; they had
joined in the same complaint in District Court challenging the ordinance, and had appeared through the same
counsel." Ante, at 5. I do not think this relationship is
relevant. Unlike the situation in Hicks v. Miranda, No,
74-156 (June-, 1975), where, as the Court held, all of
the concerned parties were in privity and therefore
could protect their interests in the state proceeding in~
volving some of them, there is no reason to belive that
1 I also agree that M & L's case should be remanded for ()Ollsideration of its claim of harassment and bad-faith prosecution by
petitioners.
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M & L could protect the interests of the other respondents which, rather than being in privity with M & L,
are its competitors. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452, 471 n. 19 (1974) , we held that the existence of a
state prosecution against Steffel's companion, who had
participated with him in the proscribed behavior, did
not bar Steffel's federal action . Similarly, it seems to
me that the existience of the state prosecution against
M & L should have no effect on the propriety of federal
relief for the remaining respondents.2 Moreover, if the
Court were correct in suggesting that the relationship
between M & L and the other two respondents should
bar injunctive relief for all respondents, I see no reason,
and the Court suggests none, for then holding that the
relationship does not also bar declaratory relief for Salem
Inn and Tim-Rob.
Nor do I think that the propriety of preliminary
relief for Salem Inn and Tim-Rob is controlled by
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) , and Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971). The principle underlying those cases is that state courts are fully competent
to adjudicate constitutional claims, and therefore a federal court should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal
proceeding. In the absence of an ongoing state proceeding, however, as we recognized in Steffel v. Thompson,
supra, a plaintiff may challenge the constitutionality of
a state statute in federal court, assuming he can satisfy
the requirements of federal jurisdiction. See also Lake
Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972).
No state proceedings were pending against Salem Inn
and Tim-Rob. Nor was there any question that they
Nor, for the reasons given in Steffel, do I think the federal court
should abstain in these circumstances. See Lake Carriers' Assn. v.
Ma.cMullan, 406 U. S. 498, 513 (POWELL, J, dissenting) .
2

-
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~atisfied the requirement of federal jurisdiction. The
Court recognizes that these respondents are entitled to
declaractory relief if they prevail on the merits. Thus,
the narrow question in this case is whether they are
entitled to a preliminary injunction, prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance against them, pending the ultimate disposition of the case. I would answer this question in the affirmative.
The Court has previously recognized that "ordinarily
the practical effect of [injunctive and declaratory] relief
will be virtually identical." Samuels v. Mackell, supra,
401 U. S., at 73. In either case the decision is a binding resolution of the dispute between the parties protecting the federal plaintiff, if the judgment is in his
favor , against future prosecution in state court. See
Samuels v. Mackell, supra, 401 U . S., at 72; Steffel v.
Thompson, supra, 415 U. S., at 476 (WHITE, J., concurring). Moreover, both remedies bar enforcement of
the contested statute or ordinance only with respect to
the federal plaintiffs; the State is free to prosecute others
who are in violation. Generally, at the conclusion of a
successful federal challenge to a state statute, a district
court can fully protect the interests of a federal plaintiff
by entering a declaratory judgment, and therefore an
injunction is unnecessary. But, prior to final judgment,
there is no form of declaratory remedy comparable to
a preliminary injunction and, unless preliminary relief is
available, plaintiffs in some situations may suffer unnecessary and substantial irreparable harm.
The traditional standard for granting a preliminary
injunction requires the plaintiff to show that otherwise
he will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely
to prevail on the merits. In deciding whether to grant
a preliminary injunction, a federal court must weigh
carefully the interests on both sides. Enjoining a state

-
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statute allows the federal plaintiff to engage in the proscribed activity pending final resolution of his case.
Such a result seriously impairs the State's interest in
enforcing its criminal laws. In these circumstances, a
federal court should gra.nt a preliminary injunction only
when the plaintiff establishes that he will suffer significant irreparable injury unless such relief is afforded, and
that he is highly likely to prevail on the merits.
In the present case respondents alleged, and petitioners did not deny, that absent pre1iminary relief they
would suffer a substantial loss of business and perhaps
even bankruptcy. Certainly the latter type of injury is
sufficient to justify interim relief; otherwise an ultimate
judgment for respondents would be useless. Both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that
respondents made a sufficient showing of irreparable
injury to justify interim relief. Although I think the
question was close, I would hold on the facts of this
case that the decision was within the discretion of the
District Court.
The only question remaining is whether respondents
made a sufficient showing of the likelihood of ultimate
success on the merits. 3 Although the customary "bar
room" type of nude dancing may involve only the barest
minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 118 (1972), that this
form of entertainment may be entitled to First Amendment protection under some circumstances. In LaRue,
however, we concluded that the broad powers of the
States to regulate the sale of liquor, conferred by the
Both courts below found such a likelihood . The District Court
talked in terms of holding the ordinance unconstitutional, but in the
context of a preliminary injunction the court must have intended
to refer only to the likelihood that respondents ultimately would
F.
prevail. The Court of Appeals properly clarified this point. 3

2d, at-.
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Twenty-First Amendment, outweighed any First Amend~
ment interest in nude dancing and that a State therefore
could bar such dancing as a part of its liquor licensing
program. In the present case petitioners' ordinance is
not tied to liqw)r licensing provisions and, indeed, it
applies to places that do not sell liquor. Nor do petitioners raise any other legitimate st.ate interests that
would overcome the presumptive constitutional protection afforded nude dancing in an establishment that is
open only to consenting adults. See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 ( 1969) . In these circumstances I would not disturb the conclusion below that
respondents have shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.4
Accordingly, finding the requisites for granting a preliminary injunction to be satisfied, I would affirm the
judgment below with respect to Salem Inn and Tim-Rob.

4 Since I conclude that respondents have made an adequate showing of success on t heir challenge to the ordinance as applied, I do
not consider their attack on the facial validity of the statutf'.
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~
The United States District Court for the Eastern
~.
District of New York preliminarily enjoined appellants,
local law enforcement officials in Nassau County, New
York, from enforcing against appellees, three corporations operating bars in North Hempstead, Long Island,
a local ordinance prohibiting nude dancing.
478 (1973).

364 F. Supp.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

affirmed, 501 F.2d 18 (1974), and we noted probable
jurisdiction.

419 U.S. 1119 (1975).

We now conclude that appellants' appeal should be
dismissed, the~ jurisdictional statement treated as a
1

petition for certiorari, and the writ granted.

On

-

-

2.

the merits, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment
insofar as it approved entry of a preliminary injunction
in favor of appellee M & L Rest., Inc., and remand that
aspect of the case for further proceedings.

In all other

respects, we affirm.
I.

On July 17, 1973, the town of North Hempstead
enacted Local Law No. 1-1973, which in relevant part
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person conducting, maintaining, or operating a cabaret, bar and/or lounge, dance hall,
or discotheque, or any other public place within .the Town of
North Hempstead to suffer or permit any waitress, barmaid,
entertainer , or other person who comes in contact with, or
appears before, or is likely to come in contact with or appear
before persons with breasts uncovered in such a manner that
the position of the breast below the top of the areola is not
covered with a fully opaque covering, or the lower part of the
torso uncovered or so thinly covered or draped as to appear
uncovered; or to appear in any scene, sketch, act or entertainment with ibrea&'is or the lower part of the torso uncovered
or so thinly draped as to appear uncovered. Reference to
breasts in this section refers to females only. Reference to
the lower part of the torso refers to both male and female.

Appellees, which operated bars for adult patrons and
offered topless dancing as entertainment, complied with
this ordinance by clothing their dancers in bikini tops.
Shortly thereafter, on August 9, 1973, appellees

filed

this action in the district court under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983,

-

-

3.

claiming that the ordinance on its face and as applied
violated the First Amendment, made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Appellees sought a

temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction,
and a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment.
The prayer for a temporary restraining
orde; was denied instanter, but the ~otion for preliminary injunction was set for a hearing on August 22,
1973.
On August 10, the day dter the appellees' complaint
was filed , and their application for a temporary restrain ing order denied, one of them, M & L Rest. , Inc., resumed
its briefly-suspended presentation of topless dancing.
On that day, and each of the three succeeding days,
M & L and its topless dancers were served with criminal
summonses based on violation of the ordinance. These
summonses were returnable before the Nassau County
Court on September 13, 1973. The other two appellees,
Salem Inn, Inc. , and Tim-Rob Bar, Inc., did not resume
the presentation of topless entertainment in their bars
until after the District Court issued its preliminary
in junction.
On September 6, 1973, after oral argument and the

filing of legal memoranda, the District Court enjoined
enforcement of the challenged ordinance against appellees
pending ultimate resolution of the case.

The court

concluded that the ordinance was facially overbroad
and that, absent preliminary relief, appellees would
suffer irreparable injury.

The District Court further

-

-

4.

found that the pending criminal prosecutions of M & L
did not require the court to refrain from granting
preliminary relief to the other appellees and that, in
this circumstance, "it would be anomalous" not to grant
such relief to M & Las well.

364 F. Supp., at 482.

The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, substantially
agreed with the District Court and affirmed the preliminary
injunction.
II.

We disagree with the courts below that M & L's
request for a preliminary injunction should be treated
identically to the requests of the other two appellees.
M & L complied with the ordinance only until it filed
its federal complaint.

Thereafter it reinstituted

topless dancing and, in response, appellants filed
criminal actions against M & Lin state court.

In these

circumstances the principles articulated in Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), govern the disposition of
M & L's case.

Were we to hold otherwise a federal

plaintiff seeking equitable relief would be allowed to
use the filing of a federal action as a shie u.l against
prosecution for conduct that occurred only after the

-

-

filing of the federal complaint.

5.

We refuse to countenance

such an abuse of federal equitable jurisdiction.
Application of the Younger principles to M & L's
case requires dismissal of its complaint unless M & L
can establish that it falls within one of the narrow
exceptions enumerated in Younger, supra, 401 U.S., at
53-54.

Seeking to avail itself of one of these exceptions

M & L a rgues that it was the subject of "repetitive
harassing criminal prosecutuions aimed at suppressing the
expressive activity carried on" at its establishment.
Brief for Appellees at 35.

The courts below had no

occasion to consider this issue.

In view of the sparse

record before us, we think it appropriate to remand this
issue for initial consideration by the District Court.
III.
The injunctions granted to Salem Inn and Tim Rob
stand on a different footing.

The principle underlying

this Court's decision in Younger is that state courts
are fully competent

, J ,0 ·

Lf /.>

~

~\1,l.

to adjudicate constitutional claims, and therefore a fed'\'\~) eral court should, in all but the most exceptional circuml
stances, refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal
proceeding. In the absence of an ongoing state proceedg, however, as we recogmzed in Steff el Y. Thompson,
~ a, a plaintiff may chall~nge the constitutionality of
a state statute in federal court, assuming he can satisfy
the requirements of federal jurisdiction. See also Lake
Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972) .
-----=._.
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-
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-

6.

Salem Inn and Tim-Rob, in contrast to M & L, complied
with the challenged ordinance until the District Court
granted appropriate relief.

Hence there are no criminal
2

prosecutions pending against these appellees.

Nor is

there any question that their complaint satisfies
Art. III's case or controversy requirement.
v. Thompson, supra, 415 U.S., at 458-460.

See Steffel
Indeed, under

Steffel, it is clear that appellees would be entitled
to a declaratory judgment a t the conclusion of their
suit if they prevail on the merits.

Thus

the narrow questicn in this case 1s whether they are
entitled to a preliminary injunction, prohibiting enforce~
ment of the ordinance against them, pending ~ ulti:n:iate_disposition of _the case. I wo'l:l:ld 1f11r:ef""frk:i:'! qttes- --<,""-t,J-e..--1- _n -_,-- J J
tie-n-m ihe affirm9,tni;&.I LI
~ 1IA..~
The Court has previously recognized that "ordinarily
the practical effect of [injunctive and declaratory] relief
will be virtually identical." Samuels v. Mackell, supra,
401 U. S., at 73. In either case the decision is a binding resolution of the dispute between the parties protecting the federal plaintiff, if the judgment is in his
favor, against future prosecution in state court. See
Samuels v, Mackell, supra, 401 TJ . S .. at 72; Steffel v.
Thompson, supra, 415 U . S., at 476 (WHITE, J ., concurring) . Moreover, both remedies bar enforcement of
the contested statute or ordinance only with respect to
the federal plaintiffs ; the State is free to prosecute others
who are in violation. Generally, at the conclusion of a
successful federal challenge to a state statute, a district
court can fully protect the interests of a federal plaintiff
by entering a declaratory judgment, and therefore an
injunction is unnecessary. But, prior to final judgment,
there is no form of declaratory remedy comparable to
a preliminary injunction and, unless preliminary relief is
available, plaintiffs in some situations may suffer unnecessary and substantial irreparable harm .
lo
obtc...,""The t,raditiaP2J stan4a.4-foPo----gffintin~
vto" LM-~ M vSt
injunction Pet=tmr~ the plaintiff~ show that otherwise
he will suffer irreparable inJury a.ael ~:!!o that he 1s likely
~
()
,wet ~ · \ to pre~il on the merits./..., In deciding whether to grant
'"t"O 'vi. ·vv--.
a preliminary injunction , a federal court must weigh
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\Statute allows the federal plaintiff to engage in the proscribed activity pending final resolution of his case.
Such a result seriously impairs the State's i1.~1t::,::e::,:re~s:::t....::_in::__ _ __ _ _ _ __
i \.\vs wle Y\
enforcing its criminal laws. i-tt--tti~~ffl~~6'R-ee&. a
federal court sho11ld grant a preliminary injunction only
,
when the plaintiff establishes that he will suffer signifi- { °'- te A. vJ ' +l. c
cant irreparable injury unle&s such relief is afforded, and c__\t..c,.J_Q;_,,.,.Q+
fo e,...
that he is highly likely to prevail on the merits.
In the present case ~one:h,n1le- alleged, and ~
~Ps did not deny, that absent pre1iminary relief they
~ ~ ~~)
would suffer a substantial loss of business and perhaps
even bankruptcy. Certainly the latter type of injury is
sufficient to justify interim relief; otherwise an ultimate
Judgment for respondents would be useless. Both the
- - -:-----,---.:District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that
fo_ \ fe I {-e._e_s \ ~onde~ rr_iade_ a ~ufficie_nt showing of irreparable l.,v'L
1hJury to Justify mtenm relief. Although f_ thmk the

t"?L,~'\-<.-

~-\tl.+~

°'~ l~V\+~

L

_

15

------JJ

d~~t!~:b ~ ~::i:io!, ::

1
: : :::

::c1=1 :f

~=

~tnet, G6ffl't.
The only question re~aining is whether kr,011dents
made a sufficient showing of the likelihood of ultimate
- succes's on the ments2.. Although the customary "bar
room" type of nude dancing may involve only the barest
minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 118 ( 1972), that this
form of entertainment may be entitled to First Amendment protection under some circumstances. In LaRue,
however, we concluded that the broad powers of the
States to regulate the sale of liquor, conferred by the
3

Both eeurh be½o11 found such a likelibo~ The District Court
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Twenty-First Amendment, outweighed any First Amendment
interest in nude dancing and that a State therefore
could bar such dancing as a part of its liquor licensing
program.

In the present case the challenged ordinance

is not tied to liquor licensing provisions and, indeed,
Nor
it applies to places that do not sell liquor. 4
do petitioners raise any other legitimate state interests
to justify the broad sweep of this ordinance.
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1969).
We therefore agree with the conclusion of the courts
below regarding the probable facial invalidity of the
North Hempstead ordinance.

Accordingly, the preliminary

injunction issued on behalf of Salem Inn and Tim-Rob is
affirmed.
It is so Ordered.

4. By its terms the ordinance applies to "cabarets"
"bars," "lounges," "discotheques," "dance halls'and any '
"public place" defined as:
''Any room, place, or space which
is occupied or arranged to be occupied for recreational,
amusement, social, sports, serving of food, or similar
purposes: or any building, shed or enclosure, whether
indoor or outdoor, coming within the occupancy and
other similar classifications of this section. For the
purposes of interpretation, the term "public place",
where used in this law, shall include the term "public
assembly" or "assembly" as may be 11i:::Ptl in other
codes, laws, ordinances, rules or regulations, a~)may be
a1rplicable in the Town of North Hempstead.

-

-
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FOOTNOTES
1.

This appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(2), which provides this Court with appellate
jurisdiction at the behest of a party relying on a state
statute held unconstitutional by a Court of Appeals.
There is some question whether§ 1254(2) confers appellate
jurisdiction to review interlocutory judgments such as
that entered below.

Compare Slaker v. O'Conner, 278 U.S.

188 (1928), and South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v.
Flemming, 351 U.S. 901 (1956), with Chicago Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 357 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1958).
Since this issue was neither briefed nor argued in this
case, we decide, as the Court previously has done, see
El Pa so v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 502-503 (1965), to
dismiss the appeal and invoke our certiorari jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2103.
2.

The pending prosecutions against M & L did not

require the District Court to abstain with respect to
the other two appellees.

See Steffel v. Thompson, 415

U.S. 452, 471 n. 19 (1974).

Nor i s this case like

Hicks v. Miranda, No. 74-156 (June_, 1975), where
the Court held that the parties seeking federal relief

-

-

b.

were in privity with s e veral of their employees who
were being prosecuted in state court.

In the presen~

case, by contrast, M & L, far from being in privity with
the other appellees, is their direct competitor .

.,/" ~- '
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CHAMBER S OF

.J US TI CE W ILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 20, 1975

Re:

No. 74-337 - Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.

Dear Chief:

'°

~

j
f
j

The attached · third draft is a recirculation of my
memorandum which I referred to in my letter to the Conference
earlier this week. In view of the voting line-up so far,
I would think that in all probability the case should be
reassigned to Lewis. You, informally, and Byron by letter
have indicated general agreement with the position t aken in
my memorandum. Bill Brennan, Potter, Thurgood, and Harry
at least tentative l y, have indicated agreement with the
position taken in Lewis' circulation of June 17th. Bill
Douglas has not voted yet.
At Conference yesterday B~ron indicated a willingness
to accommodate to Lewis' general approach, and I am certainly
to do the same. My hope would -be that if the case is
reassigned, Lewis would feel entirely free to use such parts
of my memorandum as he wished either because of agreement with
them or in the interest of putting something together in time
to hand down by the end of the Term. On the Younger issues,
even though Lewis' memorandum were to remain substantially
unchanged, if a majority agrees with its general outline, I
think I could also go along.

...

-

-
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I do not think I could go along with the treatment of
the merits '7f the First Amendment claim, however. My feeling
at Conference was that while a good argument could be made
for facial invalidity of the ordinance under United States v.
0' ~
67 (1969) and California v. LaRue, 409
U.S. 109 (1972), the two cases which Lewis cites in his opinion,
the basis for such a conclusion would be that this ordinance
by its terms applies to all sorts of public places which do not
/ serve liquor, as well as to those which do. But Lewis in his
footnote 4 indicates that he believes the "probability of
success" that appellees must show may be based on an "as applied"
attack on the ordinance.
I t Q_tally d ¼ a q_ree._with _this eosition.
Each of these three appellees operated a nightclub or bar
w..th entertainment, and "as applied" the ordinance is surely
'81id under California v. LaRue, supra. The fact that the
topless performers ~Y. have be~ dancing on the stage rather
than serving drinks to cus t omers cannot, to my mind, lead to
a different constitutional result. And while this is a local
ordinance, rather than a state statute, I would think that the
Twenty-First Amendment authority conferred upon the states
could be in turn delegated by the states to local governmental
bodies. In the absence of a state court determination to
the contrary, I would think that the normal presumption of
constitutionality would support this conclusion. Even the
Supreme Court of California, mirabile dictu, has upheld an
ordinance very similar to the one here in question. Crownover
v. Musick, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 694-696.
~

.

Because of the approach taken in my memorandum, it was
mnecessary to reach the merits of the First Amendment claim,
and so I have no occasion to express these views in that
memorandum.
Sincerely,

~

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

·it " .

-
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Jo: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas

:: ~i~~~:m~
wj[ijk-

Mr. ~~~if
Kr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Kr. Justice Powell

From: Rehnquist, J.
Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ __
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No. 74-337

Frank Doran, Etc.,
Appellant
'

v.

Salem Inn, Inc., et al.

.

On Appeal from the Umted
States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit,

[Jnne -, 1975]
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST.
Appellants are local law enforcement officials in Nassau
County, New York, whq were preliminarily enjoined by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York from enforcing a local ordinance of the
town of North Hempstead. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank,
364 F. Supp. 478 (1973), aff'd, 501 F . 2d 18 (1974). In
addition to defending the ordinance on the merits, they
contend that the complaint should have been dismissed
on the authority of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37
(1971), and its' companion cases.
Appellees are three corporations which operate bars al;.
various locations within the town. Prior to enactment
of the ordinance in question, each provided topless dancing as entertainment for its customers. On July 17,
1973, the town enacted Local Law No. 1- 1973, &n ordinance making it unlawful for bar owners and others to
permit waitresses, barmaids, and entertainers to appear
in their establishments with breasts uncovered or so
thinly draped as to appear uncovered. Appellees complied with the ordinance by clothing their dancers in
bikini tops, but on August 9, 1973, brought this action
in the District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. They
alleged that the ordinance violated their rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

t'{:- 2c .7_<
7
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Constitution. Their pleadings sought a temporary re=
straining order, a preliminary injunction, and declara
tory relief. The prayer for a temporary rest.raining
order was denied instanter, but the motion for prelim=
inary injunction was set for a hearing on August 22,
0

1973.

On August 10, the day a:fter the appellees' complaint
was filed, and their application for a temporary restrain=
ing order denied, one of them, M & L Rest., Inc., resumed
its briefly-suspended presentation of topless dancing.
On that day, and each of the three succeeding days,
M & L and its topless dancers were served with criminal
·summonses based on violation of the ordinance.1 These
"Summonses were returnable before the Nass&u County
Court on September 13, 1973. The other two appellees,
Salem Inn, Inc., and Tim-Rob Bar, Inc., did not resume
the presentation of topless entertainment in their bars
until after the District Court issued its preliminary
Injunction.
On September 5, 1973, appellant Doran filed an answer
which alleged that a criminal prosecution had been
instituted against at least one of the appellees; the
District Court was urged to "refuse to exercise jurisdic~
·tion" and to dismiss the complaint.
On September 6, 1973, on the basis of oral argument
and memoranda of law, the District Court entered an
opinion and order in which it "[found] that (1) Local
Law No. 1-1973 of the Town of North Hempstead is on
"its face violative of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
in that it prohibits across the board nonobscene conduct
in the form of topless dancing, and (2) that the daily
penalty of $500 for each violation of the ordinance, the
prior state court decision validating a similar ordinance,
1

The ordinance provides that each day's violation constitutes a
separate offense.
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the overbreadth of the ordinance, and the potential harm
to plaintiffs' business by its enforcement justify the
federal intervention and injunctive relief." 364 F. Supp.,
at 483. The court concluded by enjoining appellants
"pending the final determination of this action . . . from
prosecuting the plaintiffs for any violation of LoC'al Law
No. 1-1973 . . . or in any way interfering with their
activities which may be prohibited by the test of said
Local Law." Ibid. The court did address appellants1
Younger contention, but held that the pending prosecution against M & L did not affect the availability of
injunctive relief to Salem and Tim-Rob. As for M & L,
it concluded that if federal relief were granted to two
of the appellees, "it would be anomalous" not to extend
it to M & L as well. Id. , at 482.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
It held that the "ordinance would have to fall," 501 F.
2d, at 21, and that the claim of deprivation of constitutional rights and diminution of business warranted the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals rejected appellants' claim that the District Court
ought to have dismissed appellees' complaint on the
authority of Younger v. Harris, supra, and its companion
cases. As to Salem and Tim-Rob, Y <YUnger did not present a bar becausP. there had at no time been a pending
prosecution against them under the ordinance. As for
M & L, the court thought that it posed "a slightly different problem," 501 F. 2d, at 22, since the state prosecution was begun only one day after the filing of appellees'
complaint in the District Court. The court recognized
that this situation was not squarely covered by either
Younger or Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974) ,
but concluded that the interests of avoiding contradictory outcomes, of conservation of judicial energy, and
of a clear-cut method for determining when federal

-
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courts should defer to state prosecutions, all militated
in favor of granting relief to all three appellees;
We deal first with a preliminary jurisdictional matter.
This appeal was taken under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2),
which provides this Court with appellate jurisdiction at
the behest of a party relying on a state statute held
unconstitutional by a Cou.ct of Appeals.2 There is
authority, questioned but never put to rest, that § 1254
(2) is available only when review is sought of a final
judgment. Blaker v, O'C<Ynnor, 278 U. S. 188 (1929);
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351
U. S. 901 (1956) . But see Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka
& Smnta Fe R . Co., 357 U. S. 77, 82-83 (1958). The
present appeal, however, seeks review of the affirmance
of a preliminary injunction. We also are less than
completely certain that the Court of Appeals did in fact
hold Local Law 1- 1978 to be unconstitutional, since it
considered the merits only for the purpose of ruling on
the propriety of preliminary injunctive relief. We need
not resolve these "issues, which have neither been briefed
nor argued, because we in any event have certiorari
jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 2103. As we have previously done in an identical situation, El Paso v, Simrrwns, 379 U. S. 497, 502-503 (1965), we dismiss the
appeal and, treating the papers as a petition for certio~
rari, grant the writ of certiorari.
Turning to the Younger issues raised by petitioners,
we are faced with the necessity of determining whether
the holdings of Younger, supra, Steffel, supra, and
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971) , must give way
before such interests in efficient judicial administration
as were relied upon by the Court of Appeals. We think
2
For the purposes of § 1254 (2), local ordinances are treated as
state statutes. See, e. g., Chicago v, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
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that the interests of avoiding conflicting outcomes in the
litigation of similar issues, and in conservation of judicial
manpower, while entitled to substantial deference ip a.
unitary system, must of necessity be subordinated to the
claims of federalism in this particular area of the law.
The classic example is the petitioner ip. Steffel, supra,
and his companion. Both were warned that failure to
cease pamphleting would result in their arrest, but while
the petitioner in Steffel ceased and brought an action in
the federal court, his companion did not cease and was
prosecuted on a charge of criminal trespass in the state
court. Id., at 455-456. The same may be said of the
interest in conservation of judicial manpower. As
worthy a value as this is in a unitary system, the very
existence of one system of federal courts and 50 systems
of state cour'ts, all charged with the responsibility for
interpreting the United States Constitution, suggests that
on occasion there will be duplicating and overlapping
adjudication of cases which are suffiniently similar in
content, time, and location to justify being heard before
a single judge in a unitary system.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals, therefore,
that all three plaintiffs should automatically be thrown
into the same hopper for Younger purposes, and should
theteby each be entitled to injunctive relief. We cannot accept that view , any mor~ than we can accept appellant's equally Procrustean view tht}t because M & L
would have been barred from injun,ctive relief had it
been the sole plaintiff, Salem and Tim-Rob should likewise be barred not only from injunctive relief but from
declaratory relief as well. \Ve think that we should
begin by placin each of the individual aR ellees in the
pos1t10n reqmred by our cases if that apJ)ellee stood
alone ; i w1 t en e easier to a n ~
q~tions with an eye both to the principles of federalism
and to those of orderly judic~ l procedure.

? 7
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Respondent M & L could have pursued the course
taken by the other respondents after the denial of their
request for a temporary restraining order. Had it done
so, it would not have subjected itself to prosecution for
violation of the ordinance in the state court. When the
criminal summonses issued against M & L on the days
immediately following the filing of the federal complaint,
the federal litigation was in an embryonic stage and no
contested matter had been decided. In this posture,
M & L's prayer for injunction, had it stood alone, would
have been squarely governed by Younger.
We likewise believe that for the same reasons Samuels
v. Mackell bars M & L from obtaining declaratory relief,
absent a showing of Younger' s special circumstances even
though the state prosecution was commenced the day
following the filing of the federal complaint. Having
violated the ordinance, rather than awaiting the normal
development of its federal lawsuit, M & L cannot now
be heard to complain that its constitutional contentions
are being resolved in a state court. Thus were M & L
standing alone, its prayers for both injunctive and declaratory relief would be subject to Younger' s restrictions.3
The rule with regard to the coplaintiffs, Salem and
Tim-Rob, is equally clear, were they standing alone, insofar as they seek declaratory relief. Salem and Tim-Rob
3

Respondents urge in defense of their judgment that even if the
case is controlled by the principles of Younger and Samuels v.
Mackell, they may obtain injunctive and declaratory relief because
of the presence of the requisite special circumstances. See Y CYUnger
v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 53-54 (1971) . In particular, they claim
that M & L was the subject of "repetitive harassing criminal
prosecutions aimed at suppressing the expressive activity carried on"
at that bar. Brief for Appellees 35. The District Court did not
have occasion to consider this issue, and we decline to do so on thebasis of the spare record before us. The issue is thus left open on
remand.
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were not subject to st~te criminal prosecution at any
time prior to the issuance of a preliminary injunction
by the District Court. U11der Steffel they thus could
at least have obt11ined a declaratory jud ment upon an
ordinary showing of entitlement to that relief. Whethert ey would in addition have been similarly entit.led to a
preliminary or permanent injunction was a question
which we reserved in both Steffel, supra, at 463, and
Younger, supra, at 41.
For the purpose of applying the clearly established
holdings of Younger and Samuels to M & L, and the
clearly established holding of Steff el to Salem and TimRob, we see no reason for not treatin each of these ·oint
plaintiffs se arately. The question that remains unresolve is whether Salem and Tim-Rob are subject to
Younger insofar as they seek injunctive relief. We belive that the close relationship with M & L is of some
importance in resolving this question in this particular·
case.
In Steffel, supra, we discussed at some length the significance of the congressional intent that "declaratory
relief ... act as an alternative to the strong medicine
of the injunction and to be utilized to test the constitu-tionality of state criminal statutes in cases where inj unctive relief would be unavailable ... ." Id., at 466. We
believe this distinction between the "strong medicine"
of the injunction, with its attendant sanction for contempt, and the milder remedy of declaratory relief, holds
the key to the proper disposition of the claims in this
case. As we have already concluded, M & L must look
to state forums for vindication of its constitutional'
claims, and the state criminal proceedings against it may
go forward without interference from the federal courts.
Were the District Court to grant declaratory relief to
Salem and Tim-Ra:b, as we" hold it may, such relief would'..

-
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not carry any contempt sanctions which could-given
the close relationship to M & L-conceivably be invoked
to frustrate that criminal prosecution. The interest in
orderly procedure and accom:rriodation · of federal and
state adjudication of related federal constitutional claims
would in this manner be vindicated. Yet absent a
showing that a federal declaratory judgment is an inadequate remedy, Salem and Tim-Rob are nonetheless presumptively protected by the softer equitable remedy,
· and injunctive relief is lainl ina propriate. Not only
· is such a conclusion consonant with the general prin. ciples of equity, but it is supported by Doug"las v. City
· of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943) .
On May 3, 1943, this Court handed down decisions in
the companion cases uf Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943), and Dour/las v. City of Jeanette, supra.
In Murdock, a judgment of conviction for violation of
an ordinance of the City of Jeanette, Pennsylvania, was
reversed on the ground that the ordinance violated the
petitioner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Yet in Douglas v. Jeannette the Court affirmed a judgment of the Court of Appea.ls for the Third Circuit
which had reversed a judgment of the District Court
·enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance. This Court
;-said:
"In any event, an injunction looks to the future.
Texas Co. v. Brown, 2.38 U. S. 466, 474; Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163; 182. And
· in view of the decision rendered tod~y in Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, supra,, we find no ground for supposing that the intervention of a federal court, in
order to secure petitioners' constitutional rights, will
be either necessary or appropriate.
"For these reasons, establishing the want of equity
in the cause, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit,
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Court of Appeals directing that the bill be dismissed." 319 U. S., at 165 -166.
Nor is this result affected by the distinction between
permanent and preliminary injunctive relief. Preliminary injunctions are every bit as coercive as are the
permanent variety, but are granted .on a lesser ~howing
on the merits than are the latter. They thus afford a
protective shield, enforcible through the contempt power,
for persons who may ultimately be found lacking in any
right to relief. The language of the preliminary injunc. tion granted by the Uistrict Court in this case gives some
indication of yet another potential for abuse by putative
state court criminal defendants.
The District Court ordered that "pending the final
determination of this actfon the defendants and each
and every one of them are hereby enjoined from prosecuting the plaintiff for any ·violation of Local Law No.
1-1973 of the Town of N otth Hempstead or in any way
interfering with their activities' which 11UJ,y be prohibited
by the text of said Local Law." (Empµasis added.)
364 F. Supp., at 483. It would be difficult to conceive
of a more sweeping injunction, or of · one so entirely
divorced from the factual allegations of the complE;,int.
Paragraph 13 of that complaint alleges with respect to
the dancers emp1oyed by appellees that they are "employed only as topless dancers," they "are not waitresses
and perform no other function on the premises," and
they "dance on stages and are well received by patrons."
Paragraph 14 in turn al1eges that "only adults are permitted to enter the bar,'' that "patrons never go near
the dancers,"· and that the "dancing is performed in a
decorous manner and never offends any of the patrons.'~
App., at 9.
It is quite conceivable that either the District Courtr
the Court of Appeals, or this Court might regard these
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factual allegatio11s as having a significant bearing on the
merits of petitioners' constitutional claims. See California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109 (1972). But the injunction issued by the District Court is tied in no way to
these particular allegations, and would pose the threat
of contempt against appellants in the event that they
sought to prosecute activitiefl taking place on appellees'
premises which were not subject to the limitations
described in Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the com!}laint.
The comparison between the complaint and the injunction in this case offers a graphic illustration of why
petitioners should be limited, at least in the first instance,
to a declaratory judgment in the absence of special circumstances.4 In the event that a prosecution of someone in petitioners' position was undertaken for acts
committed on their premises quite different from those
described in Paragraphs 13 and 14 of their federal court
complaint, the state court ~n which a federal declaratory
judgment was offered as a defense would be in a position
to .compa_re the factual recitals in the declaratory judgment with the evidence adduced at the state court criminal trial. It could then make a reasoned determination
~ to whether or not the declaratory judgment collaterally estopped the State from challenging the defendants'
constitutional contentions. Should the state court proceedings turn out io be simply a rerun of the same facts
which were described in the federal court complaint , the
federal court plaintiff's rights could be appropriat ely
vindicated . But the federal court plaintiff would not be
''

I

We do not intend our disposition of any issue in this case tobear on the showing which must be made by a party who has
obtained a favo rable declaratory judgment in order to thereafter
obtain a federal court injunction against subsequent prosecution.
Compa re Steffel, v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 477-478 (1974)
( WHITE, J., concurring) , with id., at 48(}.-483 (REHNQUIST, J.,,
~QTicurring_),
4
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in a position where he could make appealingly selfserving allegations about the nature of his business,
obtain a sweeping preliminary injunction on the basis
of those allegations, and then use that injunction to
shield, at least during the litigation, conduct which may
differ sigriificantly. While even under those circumstances it might be open to state or loc&l law enforcement officials to seek modification of the injunction, the
intervening threat of contempt for violation of an injunction would enable the federal court plaintiffs to use the
federal court injunction as a much 'larger protective
umbrella than it ever should have been or was probably
intended to be.
The appeal to the Court of Appeals in this case was
taken after the issuance of a preliminary injunction
"pending the final determination of this action." While
the District Court's discussion of the constitutional issues
was in language which leaves no doubt that it considers
Local Law 1-1973 to be invalid, it did not in fact issue
~ declaratory judgment. Because there is no declaratory
j'udgment to be reviewed, and because we have concluded
that the District Court should not have granted injunctive relief, absent a showing of Y O'IJ,nger's exceptional
circumstances, we have no occasion to reach the merits.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

-

-

No. 74-337

••

June 23, 1975
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I write this memo for our file to record, in summary,
the evolution of the Court opinion in this case.
The case was assigned to Bill Rehnquist to write a
memorandum as the basis for a Court opinion.

As I could not

go along with Bill's memorandum as circulated, I wrote an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

As is

stated in Bill's letter of June 20, to the Chief Justice,
my opinion attracted "a Court" (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall
and Blackmun, with Douglas not being heard from at the time).

-

At Conference, and in light of the foregoing developments, Bill Rehnquist expressed his willingness to have the
case reassigned to me.

In the discussion that followed, it

appeared that Bill was willing to consider accepting the
substance of my position.

It was agreed that Bill and I

should meet to see if we could reach connnon ground.
We did this, and although Bill was gracious enough to
say that - since I had a "Court" - I should write the opinion,
the case has not been formally reassigned to me.

Accordingly,

upon my insistence, Bill retained it and revised his opinion
in which he adopted the essence of my position.

I must say

that I think his revision of some of the language was quite
an improvement.

-

L. F. P. , Jr.
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JusTICE REHNQUIST.

Appellants are local law enforcement officials in Nassau
County, New York, who were preliminarily enjoined by
the United States District Court for the Eastern. District
of New York from enforcing a local ordinance of the
town of North H empstead. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank,
364 F. Supp. 478 (1973), aff'd, 501 F . 2d 18 (1974). In
addition to defend ing the ordinance on the merits, they
contend that the complaint should have been dismissed
on the authority of Younger v< Harri-S, 401 U . S. 37
(1971) , and its companion cases.
Appellees are three corporations which operate bars ae,
various locations within the t0,rn. Prior to enactment
of the ordinance in question, each provided topless dancing as entertainment for its customers. On July 17,
1973, the town enacted Local Law No. 1-1973, an ordinance making it unlawful for bar owners and others to
permit waitresses, ba1maids a.nd entertainers to appear
in their establishmen ts with brrfl.!:"ts uncovered or so
thinly draped as to appear unco\·1~1cd. Appcllecs com~
plied with the ordinance hy dotliing their dauc<'rs in
bikini tops, but 011 .\ngust 9. 107:~. bruught thiR :iction
in the District Co urt 1 rndrr 4'2 C ::,;;. ( :. ~ rn~3 They
alleged that the orJin ance violated their rights under tht:"
First and Fourt ,,l'1,th An1t·Hdn1t:11ts t.o tJ1t> l1nitrJ Staf<:8.

r
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Constitution. Their pleadings sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and declaratory relief. The prayer for a temporary rest.raining
order was denied instanter, but the motion for preliminary injunction was set for a hearing on August 22,
1973.
On August 10, the day after the appellees' complaint
was filed, and their application for a temporary restra.i ning order denied, one of them, M & L Res~, Inc., resumed
its briefly-suspended presentation of topless dancing.
On that day, and each of the three succeeding days,
M & L and its topless dancers were served with criminal
·summonses based on violation of the ordinance.1 These
summonses were returnable before the Nassau County
Court on September 13, 1973. The other two appellees,
Salem Inn, Inc., and Tim-Rob Bar, Inc., did not resume
the presentation of topless entertainment in their bars
until after the District. Court issued its preliminary
injunction.
On September 5, 1973, appellant Doran filed an answer
which _alleged that a criminal prosecution had been
instituted against at least one of the appellees; the
District Court was urged to "refuse to exercise j urisdic'tion" and to dismiss the complaint.
On September 6, 1973, on the basis of oral argument
and memoranda of law, the District Court entered an
opinion and order in which it "[found] that (1) Local
Law No. 1-1973 of the Town of North Hempstead is on
its face violative of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
in that it prohibits across the board nonobscene conduct
·in the form of topless dancing, and (2) that the daily
penalty of $500 for each violation of the ordinance, the
prior state court decision validating a similar ordinance,
1 The ordinance provides that each day':- violation constitutes :i.
separate offense.

.J,

~
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the overbread th of the ordinance, and the potential ha.rm
to plaintiffs' business by its enforcement justify the
federal intervention and injunctive relief.'l 364 F. Supp.,
at 483. The court concluded by enjoining appellants
"pending the final determination of this action . .. from
prosecuting the plaintiffs for any violation of Local Law
No. 1-1973 . .. or in any way interfering with their
activities which may be prohibited by the test of sa.id
Local Law." Ibid. The court did address appellants'
Younger contention, but held that the pending prosecution against M & L did not affect the availability of
injunctive relief to Salem and Tim-Rob.- As for M & L,
it concluded that if federal relief were granted to two
of the appellees, "it w<mld be anomalous" not to extend
it to M & L as well. Id., at 482.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed by a divided vote.
It held that the "ordinance would have to fall," 501 F.
2d, at 21, and that the claim of deprivation of constitu~
tional rights and diminution of buainess warranted the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals rejected appellants' claim that the District Court
ought to have dismissed appellees' complaint on the
authority of Younger v. Ha.rri-S, supra, and its companion
cases. As to Salem and Tim-Rob, Younger did not present a bar becausP. there had at no time been a pending
prosecution against them under the ordinance. As for
M & L, the court thought that it posed "a slightly different problem," 501 F. 2d, at 22, since the state prosecution was begun only one day after the filing of appellees'
complaint in the District Court. The court recognizedthat this situation was not squarely covered by either
Younger or Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974),
but concluded that the interests of avoiding contradictory outcomes, of conserva tion of judicial energy, and
of a clear-cut method for determining when federa.l

-
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courts should defer to state prosecutions, all militated
in favor of granting relief to all three appeliees.
We deal first with a preliminary jurisdictional matter.
This appeal was taken under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2),
which provides this Court with appellate jurisdiction at
the behest of a party relying on a state statute held
unconstitutional by a Cou£t of Appeals.2 There is
authority, questioned but never· put to rest, that § 1254
(2) is available only when review is sought of a final
judgment. Blaker v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188 (1929);
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co , v. Flemming, 351
U. S. 901 (1956). But see Chica.gov. Atclrison, Topeka
& Santa Fe R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 82-83 (1958). The
present appeal, however, seeks review of the affirmance
of a preliminary injunction. We also are less than
completely certain that the Court of Appeals did in fact
hold Local Law 1-1978 to be unconstitutional, since it
considered the merits only for the purpose of ruling on
the propriety of preliminary injunctive relief. We need
not resolve these issues, which have neither been briefed
nor argued, because we in any event have certiorari
jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 2103. As we have previously done in an identical situation, El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497, 502-503 (1965), we dismiss the
appeal and, treating the papers as a petition for certiorari, grant the writ of certiorari. .
Turning to the Younger issues raised by petitioners,
we are faced ,vith the necessity of determining ,vhether
the holdings of Younger, supra, Steffel, supra, and
Sa11iuels v. 11fackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), must give way
before such interests in efficient judicial administration
as were relied upon by the Court. of Appeals. We think
z For the purposes of § 1254 (2), lot:al ordinances are treated as
state statutes. Sc,e, e. g., Chiwgo v, A trh ,~~c,n, Topeka <f· Santa. Fe
R . Co., 357 u. s. 77 (ms~).

J..J\.l.l\ ,t\. J.'1

v•

..:J/1.lJ..l'J.L\'l

1.J..".1.",

..l ,n v.

V

that the .
rest) of avoiding con fli cting outcomre the
litigation of similar issues. ~rnd ir con s@rvMie11 of jut!ieifll
m1rnpov,er1 while entitlrd to substantial deference in a.
unitary system, must of necessity be subordinated to the
claims of federalism in this particular area of tre law.
The classic example is the petitioner in Steffel,isupra,
and his companion . Both were warned that fai. ure to
cease pamphleting would result 'in their arrest, bu while
the petitioner in Steff el ceased and brought an action in
the federal court, his companion did not cease and was
prosecuted on a charge of criminal trespass in the state
court. Id., at 455-456. The same may be said of the
interest in conservation of judicial manpower. As
worthy a value as this is in a unitary system, the very
existence of one system of federal courts and 50 systems
of state courts, all charged with the responsibility for
interpreting the United States Constitution, suggests that
on occasion there will be duplicating and overlapping
adjudication of cases which are suffkiently similar in
content, time, and location to justify being h.eard before
a single judge ~a unitary system.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals, therefore,
that all three plaintiffs should automatically be thrown
into the same hopper for Y ounqer purposes, and should
thereby each be entitled to injunctive relief. We canI
not accept that view , any more than ,ve can accept petitioner
.peBaH~ equally Procrustean view that because M & L
would have be~n barred from injunctive relief had it
been the sole plaintiff, Salem and Tim-Rob should likewise be barred not only from injunctive rel ief but from
declaratory relief as well. While there plainly may
1

had they
arisen
within

D

be some circumst ance s in which legally distinct
parties are so closely relat e d that they should
all be subject to the Younger considera tions which
govern any one of them, this is not such a case -while respondents are represented by connnon counsel, a-ilft
and have similar business activities and problems,
they are apparently unrelated in terms of ownership,
control and management. We thus think that each of
the individual respondents should be placed in the
position required by our cases as if that respondent
stood alone.

-
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Respondent M & L could have pursued the course
takell by the other respondents after the denial of thrir
request for a temporary restraining order. Had it done
so, it would not have subjected itself to prosecution for
violation of the ordinance in the state court. When the
criminal summonses issued against M & L on the days
immediately following the filing of the federal complaint,
the federal litigation was in an embryonic stage and no
contested matter had been decided. In this posture,
M & L's prayer for injunction. h2d it stood alone, would
ha¥e boen/\squarely governed by Younger.
µI.
We likewise believe that for the same Teasons Samuels
v. Mackell bars M & L from obtaining declaratory relief,
absent a showing of Younger's special circumstance~even /J\
though the state prosecution ,ms commenced the day
following the filing of the federal complaint. Having
violated the ordinance, rather than awaiting the normal
development of its federa1 lawsuit, M & L cannot now
be heard to complain that its constitutional contentions
are being resolved in a state court. Thus~ M & L ',4
standing alol'le, ifa prayers for both injunctive and declaratory relief wo~ld b~subject to Younger's restrictions. 3 c;..AJIThe rule with regard to the coplaintiffs, Salem and
Tim-Rob, is equally clea~r¥,cre they standing alon~ insofar as they seek declaratory relief. Salem and Tim-Rob
3

Responden!,1,1 urge" in defense cf -tl~;1iudgment that even if the
case is contro11ed by the principles of · Young er and Samuels v.
Mackell, ~Amay obtain injunctive and declaratory relief because
of the presence of the requisite special circumstances. See Younger
v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 53-54 ( 1971 ) . In particular, they eh1i1t'l
~ M & L,1 was the subject of "repetitive harassing criminal
prosecutions aimed at suppre~ing the exprrssl\'e activity carried on"
at ,t.ha,tt\ bar. Brief for Appel!ees 35. The District Court did not
have occasion to consider this issue, 1rnd we decline to do so on the
basis of the spare record before us. The issue is thus left open on
remand.

/;f.rL/s

j d;.

;J-

~;tL.:ld
~

-
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were not subject to state criminal prosecution at any time
prior to the issuance of a preliminary injunction by the
District Court.

Under Steffel they thus could at least

have obtained a declaratory judgment upon an ordinary
showing of entitlement to that relief.

The District Court,

however, did not grant declaratory relief to Salem and
Tim-Rob, but instead granted them preliminary injunctive
relief.

Whether injunctions of future criminal prosecutions

are governed by Younger standards is a question which we
reserved in both Steffel, supra, at 463, and Younger, supra,
at 41.

We now hold that on the facts of this cas~ the

issuance of a preliminary injunction is not subject to the
restrictions of Younger.

The principle underlying Younger

and Samuels is that state courts are fully competent to
adjudicate constitutional claims, and therefore a federal
court should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances,
refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding.
In the absence of such a proceeding, however, as we recognized
in Steffel, a plaintiff may challenge the constitutionality
of the state statute in federal court, assuming he can satisfy
the requirements for federal jurisdiction.

See also Lake

Carriers' Association v. McMullen, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972).

-
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No state proceedings were pending against either Salem
or Tim-Rob at the time the District Court issued its
t.ion.
. .
. .
pre 1 1JUinary
inJunc

I

Nor was th ere 1ny ques t.ion tha t

they satisfied the requirements for federal jurisdiction.
As we have already stated, they were assuredly entitled to
declaratory relief, and since we have previously recognized
that "ordinarily the practical effect of [injunctive and
declaratory] relief will be virtually identical," Samuels,
supra, at 73, we think that Salem and Tim-Rob were entitled
to have their claims for preliminary injunctive relief
considered without regard to Younger's restrictions.

At the

conclusion of a successful federal challenge to a state
statute or local ordinance, a District Court can generally
-- protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a
declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive
medicine will be unnecessary.

But prior to final judgment

there is no established declaratory remedy comparable to a
preliminary injunction; unless preliminary relief is
available upon a proper showing, plaintiffs in some
situations may suffer unnecessary and substantial irreparable
harm.

Moreover, neither declaratory nor injunctive relief

can directly interfere with enforcement of contested statutes
or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal
plaintiffs, and the state is free to prosecute others who
may violate the statute.

-
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The tradi t ional standard for granting a preliminary
injunc tion requires the plaintiff to show that in the
absenc e of its issuance he will suffer t rreparable injury
and a lso that he is likely to prevail on the merits.

It

is recognized, however, that a District Court must weigh
careful l y the interests on both sides.

Although only

temporary, the injunction does prohibit state and local
enfo'rcement activities against the federal plaintiff
pending final resolution of his case in the federal court.
Such a r esult seriously impairs the state's interest in
enforcing its criminal laws, and implicates the concerns
for federalism which lie at the heart of Younger.

In view

of th is consideration, we believe that a District Court
should grant a · preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of a state statute or local ordinance only when the plaintiff
establishes both that he will suffer significant irreparable
injury unless such relief is afforded, and that he is highly
likely to prevail on the merits.
But while the standard to be applied by the District
Court in deciding whether a plaintiff is entitled to a
preliminary injunction is stringent, the standard of appellate
review is simply whether the issuance of the injunctio n ,

in

the light of the a pplicab le standard, constitute d a n ab u se of

discretion.

-

-
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While

we rega rd the question as a close one, we believe that the
issuance of a preliminary injunction in behalf of respondents
Salem and Tim-Rob was not an abuse of the District Court's
discretion.

As required to support such relief, these

respondents alleged (and petitioners did not deny) that
absent preliminary relief they would suffer a substantial
loss of business and perhaps even bankruptcy.

Certainly

the latter type of injury sufficiently meets the standards
for granting interim relief, for otherwise a favorable
fin a l

judgment might well be useless.
The other inquiry relevant to preliminary relief is

whether appellees made a sufficient showing of the
likelihood of.ultimate success on the merits.

Both the

District court and the court of Appeals found such a
likelihood.

The order of the District Court spoke in

terms of actually holding the ordinance unconstitutional,
but in the context of a preliminary injunction the court
must have intended to refer only to the likelihood that
respondents ultimately would prevail.
properly clarified this point.

$'0/

The Court of App eals

y

F.2d, at 20-21.

YAlthough the Court of Appea ls did not consider the
propriety of injunctive relief in light of the "highly
likely to prevail" standard which we believe to be
appropriate, its discu ssion of the merits leaves no

-

-11-

-

Although the customary "bar room" type of nude dancing
may involve only the barest minimum of P,rotected expression,
we recognized in California v. LaRue, 4~9 U.S. 109, 118 (1972),
that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First
and Fourteenth Amendment

protection under some circumstances.

In LaRue, however, we concluded that the broad powers of the
States to regulate the sale of liquor, conferred by the
Twenty-First Amendment, outweighed any First Amendment interest
in nude dancing and that a state coul<l therefore ban such
dancing as a part of its liquor license program.
In the present case, petitioner's ordinance applies
not merely to places which serve liquor, but to many other
establishments as · well.

The District Court observed, we

believe correctly:
"The local ordinance here attacked not only
prohibits topless dancing in bars but also
prohibits any female from appearing in 'any
public place' with uncovered breasts. There
is no limit to the interpretation of the
term 'any public place.'
It could include
the theater, town hall, opera house, as

doubt that it would not, even under that standard, have
concluded that the District Court had abused its discretion
in issuing the injunction. As noted, supra, at 3, the Court
of Appeals concluded that "the ordinance would have to fall."
It is thus unnecessary to remand to the Court of Appeals for
reconsideration.
It is similarly unnecessary to remand to
the District Court for reconsideration, because that court
applied a standard even more restrictive than that which is
applicable.

-
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well as the public market place, street or
any place of assembly, indoors or outdoors.
Thus, this ordinance would prohibit the
performance of the 'Ballet Africains' and
a number of other works of unquestionable
artistic and socially redeeming significance."
364 F. Supp., at 483.

we have previously held that even though a statute or ordinance
may be constitutionally applied to the activities of a particular
defendant, that defendant may challenge it on the basis of
overbreadth if it is so drawn as to sweep within its ambit
protected speech or expression of ot~er persons not before
the Court.

As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408

U.S. 104, 115 (1972):
"Because overbroad laws, like vague
ones, deter privileged activity, our
cases firmly establish appellants'
standing to raise an overbreadth
challenge."
Even if we may assume that the State of New York has
delegated its authority under the T\,1enty-First Amendment to
towns such as North Hempstead, and that the ordinance would
therefore be constitutiona lly valid under LaRue, · supra, if
limited to places dispensing alcoholic beverages, the
ordinance in this case is not so limited.

Nor do petitioners

raise any other legitimate state interest that would
counterbalance the constitutional protection presumptively
afforded to activities which are plainly within the reach
of Local Law 1-1973.
367, 377 (1969).

See United Sta tes v. O'Brie n, 391 U.S.

-
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In these circumstances, and in the light of existing
case law, we cannot conclude that the District Court abused
its discretion by granting preliminary injunctive relief.
This is the extent of our appellate inquiry, and we therefore
"intimate no view as to the ultimate merits of [respondent s']
contentions."

Brown v. Chote, supra, at 457.

The judgment

of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to respondent M

&

and affirmed as to respondents Salem and Tim-Rob.

It is so ordered.

L,
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 24, 1975

Re: No. 74-337, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.
Dear Bill,
I agree with your Memorandum in this
case and shall join it if it becqmes a Court opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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June 24, 1975

No. 74-337

Doran v. Salem Inn

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your memorandum.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

'lbe Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 24, 1975

Re:

No. 74-337 - Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.

Dear Bill:
I am glad the Executive Cormnittee on Opinions
has scored again. Although I would much prefer -if for no other reason, because the rules are becoming so intricate -- that~he requirements for
preliminary relief not be escalated by requiring
"significant" irreparable injury and a "high" likelihood of prevailing on the merits, I shall
acquiesce if your memorandum becomes the opinion for
the Court.
Sincerely,

~~
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to Conference
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JUSTICE
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BRENNAN , JR.

RE: No. 74-337

Doran v. Salem Inn

Dear Bi 11:
I agree with your memorandum and if it
becomes a Court opinion I am happy to join.

Sincerely,

/~j
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF'"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 24, 1975

Re:

74 .. 337 - Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.

Dear Bill:
I join.
Regards,

~i<;,r
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTIC E HARRY A . BLAC K MUN

June 26, 197 5

Re:

/

No. 74-337 - Doran v. Sal e m Inn

Dear Bill:
Please join me. Seriously, I think w e ought to give
consideration to the elimination of the pun in the top two lines
of what is page 11 of the circulation of June 24. This came over from page 5 of Lewis' circulation of June 17. I called
atte ntion to it then. I fear the press will make something of
this by way of ridicule of the Court.

Sincerely,

6Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference
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CHA M BER S OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 26, 1975

Re:

No. 74-456 - Hill v. Printing Industries

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your proposed per curiam circulated
June 24.

Sincerely,

✓1
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

OJ.

20",;iJ!.;l

June 27, 1975

Re: No. 74-337 - Frank Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

'cJ.?✓ 1
T. M.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference
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